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Why a Revision of the Louisiana Trust
Estates Act Is Necessary
Leonard Oppenheim*
The Louisiana Trust Estates Act of 1938 was adopted as a
result of considerable feeling that a new Trust Act should be
enacted to replace the Trust Act of 1920 which had been repealed
in 1935. This new act embodied provisions taken from various
sources, including the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, the Uniform Trust Act, the Uniform Principal and Income Act, the Uniform Trustee's Accounting Act, and
the Model Spendthrift Statute which had been prepared by Dean
Griswold of the Harvard Law School.' The actual drafting of
the act was done by the Committee on Legislation of the Trust
Section of the Louisiana Bankers' Association. Since the Trust
Estates Act consisted of one hundred sections, apparently what
was sought to be achieved was a Trust Code. The draftsmen of
the Louisiana act made some departures from their original
sources in order to conform to the constitutional provision as to
duration and also to add certain provisions which were believed
necessary to obtain the passage of the act. Although the Louisiana Trust Estates Act did solve some of the problems which had
plagued other states, the act created new problems and left unanswered a number of others. 2 Some of the difficulty has been
created because the trust is a creature of the common law which
comprehends a dual idea of ownership of property, both in law
and in equity, which is extremely difficult for the civilian to
understand.8 Moreover, the Trust' Estates Act is not sufficiently
integrated with the pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code, nor is it easily reconcilable with forced heirship, substitutions, and fidei commissa.
The many unsolved conflicts, as well as the number of un*Professor of Law, School of Law, Tulane University. This article contains
the substance of an address which the author delivered before the Baton Rouge
Bar Association in Baton Rouge, on April 14, 1958. It should be noted that the
author has recently been appointed by the Louisiana State Law Institute to study
the present Trust Estates Act with a view towards its revision.
1. See Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on the Restatement and
Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates Act, 13 TUL. L. REv. 70, 87 (1938).
2. See Note, 52 HAav. L. REv. 145 (1938) (Louisiana Trust Estates Act).
3. Garrigues, Law of Trusts, 2 AM. J. ComP. LAW 25, 35 (1953).
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answered questions, have in many instances caused lawyers to
shy away from the trust device. However, lawyers should be
aware of the possibilities presented by the Louisiana trust, both
in regard to family situations and to tax savings. They should
know the shortcomings of the Trust Estates Act and be conscious of the necessity of revamping certain of its provisions.
In 1952 certain important amendments were made to the
Louisiana Trust Estates Act. Prior to that time Louisiana trusts
had an extremely limited period of duration. Under the 1938 act
every inter vivos or testamentary trust terminated at the expiration of ten years from the settlor's death, or ten years from the
beneficiary's majority. Since the life of the beneficiary could
not have been taken as the life of the trust, the ten-year limitation not only materially reduced the flexibility of the Louisiana
trust, but its use as well. Moreover, such a short duration period
was, in many cases, inadequate to meet the needs of the settlor.
Since the limitations on the duration of trusts were included in
the State Constitution, 4 the pertinent portion of the Constitution
was also amended in 1952 to permit the creation of trusts for a
longer period than was previously possible. Under the legislation which simultaneously became effective with the adoption of
the constitutional amendment, the period of duration of a trust
in which the beneficiary is not a natural person is ten years
from the settlor's death. However, the period of duration of a
trust in which the beneficiary is a natural person is ten years
from the settlor's death, or until the beneficiary's death, whichever is the longer period, unless an early termination is required
by the trust instrument or by the court. 5
In spite of the 1952 amendments which add materially to the
use of the trust in Louisiana, so many unanswered questions still
exist that a thorough revision of the Trust Estates Act is necessary. That is not to suggest that Louisiana should completely
adopt the common law trust. It would be a serious error and
would do great violence to our fundamental civilian principles if
we were to adopt fully the common law trust in order to save a
few tax dollars. When the revision of the Trust Estates Act is
undertaken, a number of cardinal principles must be preserved
in any new act which is drafted. It is true that these factors
tend to reduce the flexibility of the Louisiana trust, both from a
4. LA.

CONST.

art. IV, § 10.

5. LA. R. S. 9:1794 (1950), as amended by Act 209 of 1952. See Oppenheim,
Louioiana'8 New Truat Law, 92 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 362 (1953).
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family standpoint and in minimizing taxes, and prevent the
Louisiana trust from achieving the same results that may be
achieved through the use of the trust device in the common law
state. However, the abolition of these fundamental principles
would cause continual problems and would be a cause for regret
forever after in this state.
These principles are four in number: first, the doctrine of
forced heirship; second, the fact that under civilian theory the
beneficiaries must be in being and definitely ascertained; third,
a limited duration period; and fourth, the prohibition of a use
of powers of appointment.
So far as forced heirship is concerned, the new act should
preserve the principle that a settlor can create a trust upon the
forced heirs' legitime or any portion thereof.6 There are many
instances where the settlor has an incompetent child who must
be protected and his income made secure or he doubts the business acumen of that child. However, the income from the trust
should not be accumulated but should be payable to the person
entitled to the legitime. This is a matter which is not entirely
clear in the present Trust Estates Act but needs clarification.7
Further, it should be made evident that the trust does not abolish
the actions of collation nor the reduction of excessive donations
by forced heirs."
In regard to the beneficiaries in being and definitely ascertained which is now provided in Section 24 of the Trust Estates
Act, 9 this fundamental civil law theory must be retained in the
new Trust Estates Act. Although it completely eliminates the
creation of the type of common law contingent remainder which
is given to persons unborn and unascertained, a serious error
would be made if such a concept were brought into Louisiana law.
Because of the corruption of the feudal system in France, the
French, at the time of the Revolution, completely abolished common law estates and returned to the simple theories of Roman
law property. 10 These theories were taken into the Louisiana
6. LA. R.S. 9:1793 (1950). See United States v. Burglass, 172 F. 2d 960
Cir. 1949).
7. The pertinent language involved is as follows: "the income therefrom may
not be accumulated but shall be paid not less than once a year to the person entitled thereto." Presumably the forced heir is the person entitled thereto.
8. LA. CivirL CODE arts. 1228, 1502 (1870).
9. LA. R.S. 9:1902 (1950).
10. See Oppenheim, The Importance of Comparative Property Law to Louisiana Lawyers, 2 LA. B.J. 243 (1955).
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Civil Code. To undo this concept and to import into Louisiana
a system which is completely unknown to our civilian jurisdiction would be a serious mistake.
In regard to the limited duration, the life of the beneficiary
being taken as the measuring life of the trust is entirely adequate and consonant with civilian theories. The introduction of
a rule against perpetuities would lead to untold difficulties. However the section of the Trust Estates Act" which provides for
its duration period needs amendment and clarification. This section provides in part as to duration: "At the expiration of ten
years from the settlor's death as to a beneficiary who is a
natural person, or until the death of the beneficiary, whichever
is the longer period." This portion of the section is unclear for
two reasons: First of all it fails to state whether the life of the
income beneficiary or the life of the principal beneficiary is to
be taken as the measuring life of the trust. It is generally believed that the life of the income beneficiary is intended, but, as
can be readily seen, this is certainly not clear from the section
itself. Second, it seems to set up a rule which requires the trust
to continue for a period beyond the death of the income beneficiary, even though the settlor may have intended otherwise.
For example, if one year after the settlor's death, the income
beneficiary died, it would appear from the section that the trust
would have to last for an additional nine years, in spite of the
fact that the settlor may have intended that the trust corpus
should go to the principal beneficiary upon the death of the
12
income beneficiary.
While the use of powers of appointment makes a substantial
contribution to the flexibility of the common law trusts, the
Louisiana Trust Estates Act contains no express provision concerning powers of appointment. However, such powers of appointment appear to be prohibited by Article 1573 of the Louisiana Civil Code which states that "the custom of willing by
testament, by the intervention of a commissary or attorney-infact is abolished." While certain provisions of the Trust Estates
Act might be interpreted as allowing powers of appointment, it
11. LA. R.S. 9:1794, § 4 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 209. See
also LA. R.S. 9:1921, § 2 (1950).
12. For other problems involving the duration period see Nabors, Entrepreneuring Trusts: Trust of Land and Mineral Properties under the Louisiana Trust
Estates Act, 27 Tur. L. REV. 263 (1953). See also Oppenheim, Limitations and
Uses of Louisiana Trusts, 27 TUL. L. REV. 41, 49 (1952).
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is doubtful if such a result would be reached by the courts.1
The attorney who at present would use a power of appointment
in a trust would assume an undue risk for his client. Moreover,
since the use of powers of appointment is not consonant with
civilian theory, such should not be included in a revision of the
Trust Estates Act.
Not only should certain sections of the Trust Estates Act be
clarified and integrated more closely with civilian principles,
but it is also necessary to decide whether or not certain devices
which are used at common law, but are not expressly authorized
by the Trust Estates Act, should be included within our law.
These are many in number, but we can take a few for illustrative purposes.
Is accumulation of income possible where the beneficiary is
someone other than an heir entitled to the legitime? While certain provisions of the present Trust Estates Act indicate that a
clause in the trust which directs the accumulation of income
would be valid, this is not entirely clear. 1 4 Since there are many
instances where accumulation of income would be extremely5
helpful, the Trust Estates Act should make this matter certain.1
While we probably would not want to incorporate in a new act
provisions which would allow the trustee to "spray the income"
among the various beneficiaries, nevertheless, in several types
of trusts an accumulation of income can be a valuable device.
For example, this may be true in the estate trust for marital
deduction purposes 6 and in a trust where the settlor stipulates
that the trust shall terminate when the beneficiary reaches a
7
certain age.'
Some other questions which are not answered under the
present Trust Estates Act relate to survivorship provisions,
contingent gifts, and conditions of forfeiture. The settlor may
desire that the survivor or survivors of several named beneficiaries shall receive the trust income, trust principal, or both,
13. LA. R.S. 9:1923, § 28 (1950). See Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act and Some Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments
Thereunder, 13 TuL. L. REV. 178, 182-83 (1939).
14. See LA. R.S. 9:1792(5), 63(9), 9:2092(c) (1950).
15. See Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana 'Trust Estates Act and
Some Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments Thereunder, 13 TUL. L. REv. 178,
183 (1939).
16. Kelleher, The Marital Deduction Under Louisiana Law, 26 TrL. L. REv.
154 (1952).
17. See Wisdom & Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate
Planning, 26 Tvi. L. REV. 119, 136, 137 (1952).
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in the event of the decease of one or more of the beneficiaries
during the trust period Thus is it possible under Louisiana
law to provide that the income shall go for life to A and B, and
then to the survivor of these two income beneficiaries, and, then
upon the survivor's death the corpus shall go to C? This is a
question which continues to plague Louisiana lawyers. Strong
arguments have been made on both sides of the question, but
there is no apparent answer under the present Trust Estates
Act.' 8 In the draft of a new act, this question should be solved
both for income and principal beneficiaries.
Likewise the settlor may desire to make the gift of the trust
principal contingent upon the continuance of that beneficiary's
life to the end of the trust period. Should the principal beneficiary die before the termination of the trust, the settlor may
desire to name the beneficiaries who will take upon the default
of the principal beneficiary rather than to permit his own heirs,
or those of the principal beneficiary, to take the trust property.
There are no express provisions in the present Trust Estates
Act covering either of the above problems; certainly as to the
legitime in trust neither the survivor nor contingency provision
should be permitted, but as to other beneficiaries the matter is
simply not evident. Moreover, the sections of the present act
which cover spendthrift trusts in some detail contain no specific
provision regarding the employment of trust clauses which provide for the forfeiture of the beneficiary's interest and the
transfer to another person in the event of the beneficiary's insolvency or the attempt of a creditor to seize his interest. While
it may be true that the shift of a beneficiary's interest should
not be permissible, this matter should be made certain in the
Trust Estates Act.
Another extremely important question involves the usufruct
in trust. One of the tax advantages of the common law trust is
the ability of the settlor to skip at least one generation for federal estate tax purposes. Thus the trust permits a settlor to
vest property in the remainderman free from taxation as part
of the estate of the life beneficiary. Even though a trust with
separate income and principal beneficiaries may be used to
achieve federal estate tax savings, the importance of the usufruct
as a family device, under Louisiana law, gives it primary signifi18. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Pascal, Some ABC's About
See also O'Quin, Our
Trust Estates and their Limitations, 22 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1948).
Trusts and Us, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 555 (1953).
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cance. When the usufruct is vested in one person and the naked
ownership in another, only one tax will be paid even though
there are two deaths. It is important to note that both usufructuary and the naked owner must be in being or conceived
and definitely ascertained at the time of the setting up of the
usufruct, and the beneficiaries of both interests must be carefully indicated by the donor. 19 The usufruct in the trust can
serve a useful function for a settlor who wants to give the income from his half of the community to his widow, and the
principal to his children. The prohibition against depriving
forced heirs of the income from the legitime would apparently
prevent use of an income-principal disposition of the legitime to
the widow and children to accomplish the same result.
Since the forced heirship rules do not deprive a spouse of
testamentary power to confirm the surviving spouse's legal usufruct, a testamentary trust of the community property which
grants the usufruct to the surviving spouse and the naked ownership to the children makes the income available to the widow,
preserves the principal for the children, and saves taxes.
The major short-comings of the usufruct itself is the failure
to separate effectively administration from enjoyment. Since
the imperfect usufruct gives the legal usufructuary title without
the necessity of giving a bond, he or she may dispose of the
property and dissipate the proceeds. Thus the naked owner will
not be protected against improvident acts on the part of the
usufructuary. Protection of both parties can be achieved by
the disposition of the usufruct in trust. By placing the property subject to the usufruct with the surviving spouse in trust,
maximum benefits can be achieved from the standpoint of the
protection of the family. The surviving spouse, as usufructuary,
will receive the income during lifetime without the responsibilities and risks of management, and the naked owner will be
more likely to receive the principal intact at the usufructuary's
demise. Furthermore, maximum tax savings will also be realized.
The validity of the disposition of a usufruct in trust has
never been litigated by the Louisiana courts. An examination
of both the Civil Code articles as to usufruct and the pertinent
sections of the Trust Estates Act indicate that the usufruct in
19. See Note, 18 TUL. L. REv. 338 (1943). See also Oppenheim, The Usufruct
of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TurL. L. REv. 181 (1943).
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trust may be permissible if liberally construed. 20 The objections
which are raised are based on the theory that civilian types of
ownership cannot be fused with the common law trust device.
Such an argument ignores the purpose of the Trust Estates Act
and fails to use the civilian devices in a manner which protects
the family and obtains tax savings. This matter however is certainly not evident from the Trust Estates Act. Since the usufruct
in trust is a highly desirable device, it should be expressly provided for in the new Trust Estates Act.
One final situation should be considered and that is the problem covering invasion of principal clauses. The opinion has been
expressed to the effect that an invasion of principal provision
would be valid where the beneficiary owns both income and
principal. 21 However, an argument can be made for the position
that an invasion of principal clause may be permissible even
22
where income and principal beneficiaries are different parties,
provided first that a proper safeguard is used to guide the trustee, and second, the interest of a forced heir is not impaired
'thereby. Again clarification is necessary to settle this matter.
Of course only a few of the many problems and situations
that need to be gone into in the drafting of a new Trust Estates
Act have been discussed.2 3 However, a sufficient number of
problems have been indicated which, in themselves, make a reexamination of the present act highly desirable, and a redrafting
an absolute necessity.
While litigation regarding the Trust Estates Act has not been
prolific, a recent case which has caused great confusion among
lawyers who do trust estate work is Succession of Guillory.24 In
this case the Citizens National Bank of Waco, Texas, as executor
and trustee under the will of Mrs. A. T. Guillory, a resident of
20. LA. R.S. 9:1861(14) (1950) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 555, 619, 620 (1870) ;
Wisdom & Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate Planning, 26

TuL L. REV. 119, 207 (1952).
21. Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act and Some
Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments Thereunder, 13 TUL. L. REV. 178, 207

-(1939).
22. See LA. R.S. 9:1943(31), (83), 9:2135 (1950).
23. Some other problems involve class gifts, the legal list, separability clauses,
community property, private trusts where the local beneficiary is not a natural
person, etc. See Nabors, Entrepreneuring Trusts: Trusts of Land and Mineral
Properties Under the Louisiana Trust Estates Act, 27 TUL. L. REV. 263 (1953) ;
.Nabors, Louisiana Trusts as Business Operating Devices, 29 TUL. L. REV. 1

(1954).
24. 232 La. 213, 94 So.2d 38,(1957). For a complete discussion of the Guillory
case, see Jackson & Jeter, The Guillory Case: What Are Its Implications for Private and Charitable Trusts, 32 TUL. L; REV. 415 (1958).
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Waco, filed a petition in the District Court for Winn Parish
seeking to have this will, which had previously been probated
and approved in Texas, recognized in Louisiana. The will provided that certain property had been bequeathed to the bank
to be held in trust "during the lifetime of Terrell Guillory, and
at his death, the naked ownership as well as the possession being
bequeathed 'to the

. .

. Baptist General Convention of the State

of Louisiana'" and not to be sold, but kept so that the revenue
derived therefrom might be used for the benefit of the Baptist
denomination of the State of Louisiana.
It is important to note that counsel representing the nonresident son, Terrell Guillory, excepted to the petition on the
ground that it had disclosed neither a cause nor a right of action, inasmuch as (1) the bank was not qualified to act as trustee; (2) the will attempted to establish a trust for a period
longer than ten years from decedent's death, and, for that reason, was null; (3) that it was null because it contained a prohibited substitution bequeathing the property to one legatee to
be held in trust by it for the benefit of decedent's son, and, at
his death, bequeathing this same property to another legatee;
and (4) that it contravened the public policy of Louisiana by
barring any alienation of the property by the second beneficiary
under the will and thus forever removing it from commerce.
The trial judge rendered judgment sustaining the objections
and dismissed the suit.
The Supreme Court in its holding stated as follows:
"The bequest is clearly a prohibitive substitution, and,
as such, violative of the public policy of this State as expressed in our basic and statutory law, Sec. 16 of the 4th
Article of the Constitution of 1921; Art. 1520 of the Revised
Civil Code; R.S. 9; 1791, and even though such bequest may
be valid in Texas, where the will was made, it will not be
enforced insofar as it affects property in this State [citation
of authority]. Consequently, the Trial Judge properly maintained the exceptions of no cause and no right of action."
The matter which disturbs attorneys is trying to ascertain
exactly what is the meaning of the case. If it is carried to the
extremes which some lawyers suggest, it will completely destroy

608

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVIII

the Trust Estates Act in Louisiana. 25 If it stands for the proposition that this is a prohibitive substitution because of the way
the will is written, i.e., in common law terminology and not
consonant with our concept of trusts, then the case of itself will
do no damage. Finally, if it means that a mixed trust, i.e., one
which has a private income beneficiary and a charitable principal beneficiary, is not permitted, then this is a matter which
should be straightened out in the new Trust Estates Act.
At any rate this case again clearly illustrates the necessity
for a revision of the present Trust Estates Act which will solve
many of the unanswered questions such as are raised in the
Guillory case.
25. Jackson & Jeter, supra note 24, at 423: "The most dangerous implication
to be drawn from the Guillory case is that any trust may create a substitution if
the gift is to trustees to hold, manage and invest (preserve), and distribute (return) to someone else at the termination of the trust. While this is an unlikely
reason for the decision, it is certainly a possibility."

